After Virtue is not exactly a novel, but it does contain philosophical discussions in the form of hypothetical narratives, a la Plato's Republic perhaps, somewhere between prose and straight philosophy. This text is dense and complex, but here is the gist of what each of the 19 chapters indicates. (The 19th chapter is a postscript to the second edition).
Chapter 1. In a hypothetical, the public has turned against scientists and attempted to remove science's influence from public life. The result is a technologically savvy community, but without anyone who can truly understand the tools or explain the technology. Everyone is merely able to use it. He then analyzes the plausibility of this hypothetical and shows the difficulty of understanding the present moment. If such a world would exist, MacIntyre suggests that it would be nearly impossible to detect. The implication is that our society has already done this to the philosophers.
Chapter 2. Even if an opinion is formed logically and expressed in a valid, understandable way, the method used to decide between various opinions is still subjective and arbitrary. MacIntyre then wonders whether perhaps this is just a facet of our modern culture, or whether morality is just inherently non-logical.
Chapter 3. This chapter focuses on the nuances between personal moral philosophies and the emergence of sociological results. He notes that the inability to discern morality with logic also means that the world exists as a competition of power and bureaucratic success.
Chapter 4. MacIntyre recalls that in the Enlightment, when philosophy was in vogue, the personalities associated with each philosophy were known by the public, but after the Enlightment, the common man became further and further removed from philosophical literacy.
Chapter 5. MacIntyre concedes that the Enlightment attempt was doomed from the get-go. He mentions Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics and the idea of ethics as the scientific practice of determine which moral ideas will bring man to his full potential. This depends on man having an essential nature, so the existentialism of today's culture doesn't permit for this type of ethic.
Chapter 6. The Enlightenment's failure led to the chaotic state of modern morality and ethics, leading to the utilitarian mode that shaped the 20th century and onward.
Chapter 7. There is an issue with the modern idea of "fact" and the common acceptance of truthfulness as the product of expertise instead of empirical conception. We're willing to trust what other people tell us.
Chapter 8. Instead of using social sciences as science, which would involve the use of past knowledge to predict future events by virtue of the "science" part of "social sciences," social studies and humanist studies are essentially generalizations. The knowlege that is gained by studying the past in this way is useless in its original intent.
Chapter 9. There is a problem between existentialism and essentialism, especially in the way they coincide in various aspects of culture and society. Either there is an essence to humankind, or there is not. There is a problem of inconsistency in modern culture. He discusses Nietzsche and Aristotle as the forefathers of this debate.
Chapter 10. One possible option might be narrative based, and there are definitely commonalities in the moralistic and ethical claims of epic poems and other hero-based narratives. Hero stories seem childish to the modern man.
Chapter 11. MacIntyre turns to analyze the Athenian ideas of virtues and ethics, discussing Homeric virtue, and the problem of sophistry in Plato's time. Compare this idea to Sophocles who, like Shakespeare, viewed the world as narrative-based instead of logical-based.
Chapter 12. Aristotle, revisited. In this chapter, Aristotle's ethic is unpacked further, revisiting virtues as civic instruments and the interplay of relationships in the development of the self—especially the ancient Greek virtue of friendship.
Chapter 13. Now MacIntyre turns to compare the Medieval point of view the perspectives already mentioned. He notices the political tone of Medieval ethics. There are also neo-Platonist and Cartesian vibes to Medieval ethics.
Chapter 14. One strategy for determining a good ethic might be to compare different worldviews and take the commonalities, but that won't work, says MacIntyre, and he spends this chapter unpacking the rival accounts of the Greeks, the Christians, and also certain humanists, drawing attention to the incompatibility of their ideologies.
Chapter 15. This chapter deals with the function of tradition in the development of social unity and a sense of identity. This highlights the need for the narrative mode in understanding ethics.
Chapter 16. The change toward hyper-individualized life brought about the pluralism of ideas that led to this problem of ethics in the first place, and perhaps there is a hint at the future of ethics as a return to teliology.
Chapter 17. Justice itself, the very root issue of classical ethics (especially the Greeks) is a term that isn't agreed upon anymore. The various factions that exist in society, and the many ways we use groups to determine our identity all combine to create an individualized opinion of justice itself.
Chapter 18. Revisiting the essentialist question, Trotsky and Benedict are offered as possible extensions of Nietzsche and Aristotle's respective approaches. He concludes by defending the assumption that this fall of ethics is the same problem that Rome faced in the end of their civilization.
Chapter 19. MacIntyre defends After Virtue by responding to various critics of the first edition. He makes a few corrections.
