The Bitter Sweetness of Truth
Imagery is very often linked to sensory details which coerce the reader into associating the text with things smell, taste, sounds, etc. One very simple example is when Aristotle is analyzing the concept of apprehending truth through appearances and the ways and means in which this can create complications:
“some have inferred from observation of the sensible world the truth of appearances…that the truth should not be determined by the large or small number of those who hold a belief, and that the same thing is thought sweet by some when they taste it, and bitter by others, so that if all were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were well or sane, these would be thought ill and mad, and not the others.”
Philosophical Measurement
Measurement is of sublime significant in metaphysical terms. At least, according to Aristotle. If something cannot be accurately measured, it essentially can never be understood and since understanding is key to knowledge and knowledge is the basis of wisdom, the wise man learns to measure well, even when measuring imagery:
“The measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured; the measure of spatial magnitudes is a spatial magnitude, and in particular that of length is a length, that of breadth a breadth, that of articulate sound an articulate sound, that of weight a weight, that of units a unit.”
On the Likeness of Things
Another important element of metaphysics is determining what makes things alike and what constitutes a natural and organic difference. The use of color is another common feature of much imagery and here is a case where Aristotle engages its power:
“Other things are called like if the qualities they have in common are more numerous than those in which they differ—either the qualities in general or the prominent qualities; e.g. tin is like silver, qua white, and gold is like fire, qua yellow and red.”
Accidents Will Happen—Usually by Accident
Probably the only people who have ever spend mountains of time reflecting on the ideological difference between an accident and a thing done on purpose are philosophers. For the rest of it is just so easy: things that aren’t planned are accidents. Not so much for Aristotle; things get a little deeper:
“for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is an animal.”
