The simile of the philosopher’s attitudes
The narrator compares the conclusions of philosophers to ancient philosophers’ attitudes. The narrator writes, “I say set aside rather than argue against because their attitude toward the traditional problematic is like the attitude of seventeenth century philosophers toward the scholastic problematic.” According to the narrator, philosophers have not devoted themselves identifying the antique theoretical flaws in the work of their antecedents.
Simile of the book’s writings
The narrator compares his book the writings of the philosophers that he admires. The narrator writes, “The book, like the writings of the philosophers I most admire, is therapeutic rather than constructive.” However, the narrator criticizes the findings of those philosophers arguing that they are based on unverified facts. Therefore, the narrator is urging his readers to side with him and join him in criticizing the ancient philosophical work.
The simile of phenomenology
The narrator says that he is familiar with several modern philosophical writings and he compares them to classical Husserlian phenomenology. The narrator writes. “As I see it, the kind of philosophy which stems from Russeli and Frege is, like classical Husserlian phenomenology, simply one more attempt to put philosophy in the position which Kant wished it to have-that of judging other areas of culture on the basis of its special knowledge of the foundations of these areas.”
The simile of Cartesian dualism
Ancient philosophers’ intuitions are compared to Cartesian dualism. The narrator writes, “These purported intuitions serve to keep something like Cartesian dualism alive.” The philosophers who came after Wittgensteinianism, strongly opposed behaviorism and avariciousness because such attributes are only focused on fueling human orgasm rather than addressing the vital questions based on factual findings.
The simile of the cartesian intuition
The narrator realizes that intuition seems to philosophers as an enough proof to establish unbridgeable gaps. The narrator says, “But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental-physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains.”
